? Academy of Management Review, 1987, Vol. 12, No. 3, 486-498. Interdependence: An Alternative Conceptualization BART VICTOR University of Nebraska, Lincoln RICHARD S. BLACKBURN University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Conceptualizations of interdependence offered by Thompson (1967) and McCann and Ferry (1979) fail to satisfy basic requirements for empirical or practical investigations of complex organizations. An alternative conceptualization based on interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959 ) is presented here and used to explain the causes of interunit conflict and the effectiveness of coordination strategy. Hypotheses are presented, and future research is proposed.
Units within organizations remain to a greater or lesser degree interdependent as a necessary consequence of the division of labor. While the determinants of the division of labor have been extensively investigated, less attention has been paid to the consequences of that division. In particular, the effects of the interdependence between work units have not been adequately investigated (Jones, 1984; McCann & Galbraith, 1981) . It is argued here that expanding our knowledge of interdependence requires a more fully developed interdependence construct. This paper critiques the development and operationalization of this construct and offers an alternative based on interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) . Lewin (1951) described constructs as tools used to solve problems. As a tool, the more developed the construct, the more effective it can be in problem solving. Such development entails first defining the basic conceptual elements of constructs. By so defining constructs, related constructs can be distinguished and instances of the same construct can be compared. In the case of interunit interdependence this construct should enable one to (a) compare the effects of different amounts of interdependence in organizations, and (b) distinguish between interdependence and other concomitant consequences of the division of labor. Neither of the constructs currently offered in the literature meet these minimum criteria.
Current Interdependence Constructs
Thompson's Construct Thompson (1967) identified three patterns of work flow that can exist between units, each representing a different intensity or degree of linkage between units.
Pooled interdependence represents an absence of work flow between units. Each unit uses independent inputs and makes independent contributions to the organization. Serial interdependence represents a unidirectional exchange pattern where each unit's inputs are the outputs from another unit and similarly, each unit's outputs are another unit's inputs. Reciprocal interdependence represents a contingent pattem in the work flow where each unit's inputs are its own outputs, recycled through other units. Thompson conceptualized interdependence as the extent to which the relationship between work units could be characterized by one of these types of interdependence.
McCann and Ferry's Construct
The second interdependence construct is based on an analysis of the transactions or exchanges between work units (McCann & Ferry, 1979) . McCann and Ferry conceptualized interdependence in terms of the characteristics of the resources exchanged between work units. They operationalized interdependence as an additive function of number of resources exchanged, amount of each resource, frequency of transaction, amount of time before loss of resource has an impact on the unit, and the value of the resources to the unit.
Limitations of the Current Constructs
Each of these approaches has been used in organization theory. (For reviews of the empirical research on interdependence, see Fry, 1982, and Galbraith, 1981 .) Nevertheless, it can be argued that neither construct meets Lewin's criteria. In particular, the constructs preclude an empirical assessment of differing amounts of interdependence.
For instance, while Thompson's construct suggests an operationalization of interdependence, it is at best an ordinal scale. Thompson proposed that the amount of interdependence in a pooled process is less than the amount of interdependence in a serial process. Further, both pooled and serial processes signify less interdependence than a reciprocal process, but how much more or less interdependence characterizes the differences between the processes is not specified. McCann and Galbraith (1981) For example, in addition to depending on a purchasing unit for raw materials, a production unit also may need materials delivered at specific times during production. A failure to coordinate shipping and receiving schedules might be as serious a problem for the production unit as a failure to deliver the materials at all. However, McCann and Ferry do not explicitly include a measure of such interdependence based on contingent or reciprocal requirements. As a result, their construct cannot accurately represent amounts of interdependence.
An Alternative Construct
Interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) provides an alternative framework for conceptualizing interdependence. Constructs developed from this framework can differentiate explicitly between levels of interdependence. Further, such constructs can permit precise distinctions between amounts of interdependence and other concomitant consequences of the division of labor. With constructs so derived, critical characteristics of the relations between work units can be compared and contrasted.
Interdependence Theory
Interdependence theory has provided one of the major theoretical frameworks for social psychology since its original formulation in 1959 (Allport, 1985) . Since that time, interdependence theory has been applied to the study of a wide range of dyadic and intergroup phenomena including bargaining behavior (e.g., Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Pruitt, 1970) , conflict resolution (e.g., Deutsch, 1973) , and the evolution of intergroup relationships (e. g., Insko et al., 1980 Insko et al., , 1982 . Applying interdependence theory to the study of organizational process was suggested by Weick (1979) .
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Interdependence theory proposes that the relationship between one work unit and another work unit(s) can be described in terms of three Finally, to the extent that A can influence its own performance by taking a particular action (e.g., completing a task, stocking materials), it is described as having reflexive control (RC). From an interdependence theory perspective, any interunit relationship can be described in terms of A's fate and behavior control over B, B's fate and behavior control over A, and each unit's own reflexive control.
Like McCann and Ferry's (1979) approach, the unit of analysis is the work unit, represented by a manager and subordinates. The assumption is made that the outcomes of the work unit can be represented as outcome levels assessed by a manager. Such outcome levels are an operationalization of the complex factors affecting the subjective utility of any alternative. Factors such as goals (Bowen & Jones, 1986) , exchange and coordination costs (Williamson, 1975) , and political, strategic, and personal motivations (Jones, 1984; McClintock, 1972) may be incorporated in an assessment. How closely these outcomes correspond to the objective utility of such alternatives (Ford, 1979; Fry, 1982) Unit A is presented in Figure 5 . As the amount of fate and behavior control increases, relative to the amount of reflexive control, the index increases from zero (completely independent) to 1.0 (completely dependent).
In the above example the index of dependence for the sales manager (A) is 1.0, indicating that his or her actions are completely dependent on those of the credit manager. In the example, she/he was described as subject only to fate control by the credit manager. The index is . 33 (moderately independent) for the credit manager (B).
In the example, the credit manager is described as having strong reflexive control and being sub- It has been demonstrated then that interdependence theory can describe different amounts of interunit interdependence. In so doing, the construct satisfies Lewin's first requirement. It must, however, be demonstrated that the proposed interdependence construct can satisfy Lewin's second requirement, that it can be differentiated from related constructs. One such related construct is interunit conflict. When labor is divided, the structure of the consequent relations between units creates some potential for interunit conflict (Jones, 1984; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967) . 
Applying the New Construct Determinants of Interunit Conflict
Consider the credit and sales managers reviewing two orders-one from a reliable customer, the other from a questionable customer. In the case of the customer of questionable repute, the sales manager wants to approve the order, but the credit manager wants to disapprove it. The sales manager wants the credit manager to approve the order, and the credit manager wants the sales manager to disapprove it. The interdependence between the two managers is represented as mcatrix X in Figure 6 . In matrix X both the sales manager (A) and the credit manager (B) are subject to fate control (3) and have reflexive control (6). In this case, the fate control and reflexive control are noncorre- It is at this point that the inadequacy of the current constructs becomes most apparent. Lewin (1951, p. 37 ) stated that related constructs should be derivable from distinct functions of common elements. Only constructs so derivedl can be cdis- formality, cooperativeness, and localization.
Informal, decentralized, and cooperative strategies can be characterized as lateral or organic, while formal, centralized, and controlling strategies can be characterized as vertical or mechanistic (Burns & Stalker, 1961) .
Interdependence and Coordination. Thompson (1967) proposed that pooled, serial, and reciprocal interdependence would be increasingly difficult to coordinate. He argued that a preferred mode of coordination should be associated with each type of interdependence. Using the terminology of McCann and Galbraith (1981) Thompson predicted that under norms of rationality, increasing interdependence should be coordinated by increasingly informal, localized, and cooperative strategies.
Thompson described increasing amounts of interdependence as posing increasing degrees of contingency to interdependent units. Such contingency represents increasing ambiguity and uncertainty in the coordination process (Jones, 1984) . The degree of contingency posed by interdependence is described as affecting the frequency and volume of communication and decision making between units.
With pooled interdependence, action can proceed without regard to action in other positions .... With sequential interdependence, however, each position in the set must be readjusted if any one of them acts improperly .... With reciprocal interdependence . . . the actions of each position in the set must be adjusted to the actions of one or more others in the set (Thompson, 1967, p. 58) .
In response to the sheer volume of coordination requirements, Thompson recommended increasingly lateral, organic coordination strategies. As the amount of interdependence increases, "organizations seek to localize interaction and confine it to conditionally autonomous groups-to cluster positions and groups into the smallest possible inclusive units in order to minimize coordination costs" (Thompson, 1967, p. 60) .
In general, empirical research supports Thompson's propositions. For example, the Aston studies indicated that work flow interdependence was positively related to the localization of authority and negatively related to the degree of formalization (Aldrich, 1972; Child, 1973 , HIickson, Pugh, & Pheysey, 1969 . In contrast, Mohr (1971) Consistent with Thompson then, it is hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 1: Increases in the amount of interdependence created by the division of labor should be associated with the selection and effectiveness of increasingly lateral, organic coordination strategies.
Conflict and Coordination. The amount of interunit conflict also has been proposed as a determinate of the effectiveness of a coordination strategy. Organizations may use rules and guidelines to manage low levels of interunit conflict. According to March and Simon (1958) , managers faced with interunit conflict prefer unilateral (e.g., rules, programs) rather than multilateral techniques (e.g., bargaining or confrontation) to resolve the conflict. As the amount of conflipt increases, managers need to use mediated confrontation to help resolve disagreements between units (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Nielson, 1972) . At high levels of interunit conflict, organizations need to use even more assertive hierarchical or forcing methods to manage the relations between units. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) noted that in the face of pure conflict "the usefulness of openness and confrontation is probably severely limited" (p. 205).
These propositions are consistent with the findings and theory on bargaining in organizations. In laboratory studies of bargaining dyads, increasing degrees of conflict have been associated with an increased preference for third party intervention (Rubin, 1980) . This association may be due to interdependent parties recognizing that, in the face of increasing conflict of interest, they may not be able to settle their differences on their own (Rubin, 1980) . Thus, increasing amounts of interdependence may be associated with increasingly lateral or organic strategies. Increasing amounts of conflict may require quite distinct responses. Therefore, it is further specified that:
Hypothesis 2: Increases in the noncorrespondence of outcomes created by the division of labor will be associated with the selection and effectiveness of increasingly vertical or mechanistic coordination strategies.
The joint effects of the division of labor on coordination strategy predicted in Hypotheses 1 and 2 are displayed in Figure 8 . In contrast with the traditional unidimensional continuum used to describe the distinction between mechanistic and organic strategies, the dimensions are conceptualized as independent variables which together describe particular types of coordination strategies. In Figure 8 , along the X axis is a continuum representing a progression from low levels to high levels of contingency management strategies. Along this continuum, Thompson's predictions fall. When the amount of interdependence is low, there is little contingency to be coordinated between units. Therefore, a minimal strategy is appropriate, such as "devising rules which apply to certain processes or categories of activity whenever and wherever these occur in the organization" (Thompson, 1967, p. 61 Along the Y axis is a continuum representing a progression from low to high levels of conflict management strategies. Along this axis, the predicted responses to noncorrespondence of outcomes fall. As the amount of noncorrespondence increases, conflict resolution requirements in-crease. To resolve increasing amounts of conflict, more and more formalization, centralization, and control are needed. This continuum culminates in centralized, hierarchical coordinating strategies. Therefore, the optimal coordination strategy is described as an admixture of both contingency and conflict management elements, each in response to a concomitant characteristic of the division of labor.
The model in Figure 8 permits predictions regarding the selection and effectiveness of hybrid coordination strategies such as the matrix structure (Davis & Lawrence, 1977; Galbraith, 1973) . Davis and Lawrence (1977) described the matrix as organic structures such as teams overlaid onto a mechanistic structure. They predicted that the matrix would be most effective when both requirements for contingency management are high and when the requirements for conflict resolution are high (due to the need to maintain a dual focus and to distribute scarce resources).
Implications
By employing the structural framework of interdependence theory, future studies can define more explicitly the possible determinants of the effectiveness of coordination strategy. However, one critical problem to be resolved is estimating the structural components of interdependence in the field. Although researchers of bargaining and other game theoretic applications of interdependence theory have manipulated component utilities in the laboratory, little field estimation of such utilities has been done.
One of the critical measurement issues is whether to estimate the constructs directly or to estimate the components first, and then calculate the indices. In studies of personal relationships, researchers have explored both strategies. For example, Walster, Walster, and Traupman (1978) 
Further Advantages
The advantages of this application of interdependence theory extend beyond its facility for analyzing the concomitant effects of interdependence and interunit conflict. This framework also can be applied to investigating other consequences of the division of labor. For example, the relative power between units in terms of magnitudes and asymmetries of dependence can be calculated from the matrix structure, and the propositions of resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) can be modeled. In general, resource dependence theory proposes that coalitions (e.g., work units) attempt to change their relationship with the environment by either decreasing their dependence on others or increasing others' dependence on them (Ulrich & Barney, 1984) . Both of these objectives can be modeled as changes in either the magnitude or symmetry of interdependence (again employing the basic conceptual elements described above).
Further, structural bases of power can be isolated to distinguish between exchange dependence (relative dependence on others' actions) and coordination dependence (relative dependence on joint actions). Thus, beyond the specific advantages of a more robust interdependence construct, the major implication of the argument presented here is the utility of interdependence theory as a framework for studying organizations.
